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STUDENT NOTES
Usury Laws as Applied to Credit Sales -
The Need for Revision
The system of installment buying has constituted a revolution
in American economic thinking and behavior, and credit sales have
raised legal issues which now touch a large segment of the popula-
tion. One of these issues concerns the application of state and federal
usury statutes to this form of business transaction.
Usury, in Biblical times, encompassed any transaction in which
interest was charged. It did not matter whether interest was charged
in money or in kind.' The first English statutes concerning the
matter had substantially the same effect.' As the English economy
began to evolve into a more complex system to meet the expanding
' Deuteronomy 23:19.
'An Act Against Usury 13 Eliz. c. 8, § IX (1570).
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needs of a growing, centralized, urban population, it became neces-
sary for the usury laws, like many others, to undergo certain changes.
As a result of the industrial revolution they were repealed and new
statutes fixed the rate of interest on a loan or forbearance of money.3
One of the first English cases seemed to say that these statutes would
apply to a sales transaction;' however, this tendency was nipped in
its embryonmic stages when, in 1821, Beete v. Bidgood5 -held that
the sale of real estate was a bona fide credit sale, rather than a loan
or forbearance of money, and therefore that the usury statutes were
inapplicable. This case had a definite influence on early American
cases which were also concerned with the sale of real estate,6 and
on later cases involving the sale of personal property.
Generally, statutes throughout the country have language stating
that the lawful rate of interest for the loan or use of money shall be
six per cent per annum. The courts are generally in accord, in inter-
preting these statutes, as to the elements necessary to constitute a
violation thereof, the criteria usually being: 1. A loan or forbearance
of money; 2. an agreement to return money absolutely; 3. an agree-
ment to pay in excess of the lawful rate, and 4. an unlawful interest!
Most courts also state that they will prevent any sham or device to
be used to evade the usury statutes.8 In direct contrast to the position
taken by the courts, against the use of sham or device to evade usury
laws, it is surprising to find that the courts seldom find usury lurking
behind the cloak of a sale. Although the statutory language of the
usury laws sounds strongly protective, a credit buyer will be fortunate
if the sales agreement with which he is presented does not provide
on its face for a finance charge far in excess of the established
statutory lawful rate. Does the seller violate the usury laws by
charging the excess amount? With very few exceptions the federal9
and state"0 courts have held that he does not. The courts merely say
that no one has loaned the buyer any money and he is not paying
I An Act to Reduce the Rate of Interest Without Prejudice to Parliament-
ary Securities, 12 Anne c. 16 (1714).
4 Dewar v. Span, 3 Term Rep. 425, 100 Eng. Rep. 656 (1789).
57 Barn & Cress 435, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (1821).6 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 38 (1861); Dry Dock Bank v.
American Insurance Co., 3 N.Y. 344 (1850).7 In re Bibbey, 9 F.2d 944 (8th Cir. 1925); Equitable Credit and Dis-
count Corp. v. Geir, 342 Pa. 445, 21 A.2d 53 (1941).
855 AM. Jun., Usury § 21 (1946).9 Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 38 (1861).10 55 AM. Jun., Usury § 23 (1946).
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interest. He is only paying a higher price than the one paid by a cash
purchaser."
These holdings are results of two basic ideas which have been
carried over from Beete v. Bidgood, supra: first, that the time dif-
ferential is a part of the credit price;'" and second, that a bona fide
sale does not come within the meaning of the term loan or forbear-
ance of money. 3 If the transaction, alleged to be usurious, is cast
in the form of a sale rather than a loan most courts will allow the
seller to evade usury restrictions.' 4 Courts, in distinguishing between
interest and finance charges, take the view that a seller in a free
economic society has the right to charge whatever he pleases for
his goods.' The difference between the cash price and the higher
credit price represents the increased cost of servicing a credit account
rather than compensation for forbearance or the use of money.'
They circumvent what on the surface has the appearance of charging
excess interest by holding that the legislature's intent in passing the
usury laws was not to protect the credit purchaser but rather to
safeguard the needy who lack available cash for necessities.' 7
These distinctions, between a loan or forbearance and a credit
sale, seem to be completely lacking in reason when the problem is
one of determining whether usury is present in a contract. For
example: if a party, X, needs a given article to perform his work
he may buy it on credit or pay cash. If he borrows the money from
a bank, in order to pay cash, he must pay interest to the lender; if
he buys it by a credit sale he must pay a finance charge to the dealer.
In both instances X has an added cost in acquiring a necessity. Under
the distinction drawn by the courts, the lender is limited in the amount
of interest he may charge by the usury law but the dealer is not
limited in the extent of the finance charge. This result is often upheld
by showing in scholarly works, though not generally in the decisions,
" Cobb v. Baxter, ____ Okla . . 292 P.2d 389 (1956).
12 Richardson v. C.I.T., 60 Ga. App. 780, 5 S.E.2d 250 (1939); Yeager
v. Ainsworth, 202 Miss. 247, 32 So.2d 548 (1947).
"3 Commercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926);
Underwriters Acceptance Corp. v. Dunkin, 152 Neb. 550, 41 N.W.2d 885(1950).
14Seeman v. Philadelphia Warehouse Co., 274 U.S. 403 (1927); Com-
mercial Credit Co. v. Tarwater, 215 Ala. 123, 110 So. 39 (1926).
5 Fisher v. Hoover, 21 S.W. 930 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893).
'
6 Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W.2d
973 (1952).
17 General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Weinrich, 218 Mo. App. 68, 262
S.W. 425 (1924).
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that a lending company requires more collateral than a finance com-
pany and therefore since the latter's risk is greater so should its return
be greater. This would indicate the desirability of legislative adjust-
ments of interest rates proportionately to the security received, but
it does not justify limiting interest on a direct loan while exempting
altogether a finance charge."
Courts often state that they will look beyond the form and
into the substance of the transaction to determine whether usury
is present; 9 however, they fail to make clear the test to determine
if the substance to which they look is usurious. There have been
cases where the form of the sale was so inadequate that the most
reluctant court could not fail to detect usury.20 Once again, even
the most reluctant courts admit the vulnerability of credit sales to
usury laws when a vendor's action clearly shows a criminal intent
and where strong evidence supports a finding of usury.2 This is a
decided fallacy in the usury area which requires the extreme degree
of certainty before the contract will be termed usurious. As a result
of this many courts find themselves paying only lip service to their
belief that substance not form should be controlling.2 2
The courts generally have shown no tendency to extend the
applicability of usury statutes to credit sales or interpret them to
meet the conditions existing in the world today. In a small minority
of lower court cases, decisions have favored the extension of such
laws and though they were not upheld by the higher courts their
reasoning should be noted. In Failing v. National Bond & Investment
Corp.,23 the court stated:
"If it is the needy whose protection the usury laws are enacted
to guard, is the need of him who borrows that he may buy for
cash greater than he who purchases for credit? Where lies the
difference . . . Tweedledum and Tweedledee have no place in
the law today, which professes to seek the truth; whose aim isjustice."
One decision that may bring about eventual change is Dellard
18 2 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 173 (1935).
19Dunn v. Midland Loan Finance Corp., 266 Minn. 550, 289 N.W. 411
(1939).21Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 556, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944).
21 Powell v. Edwards, 162 Neb. 11, 75 N.W.2d 122 (1956).
22 Brooks v. Auto Wholesalers Inc., 101 A.2d 255 (D.C. Mun. App. 1953).23 Failing v. National Bond and Investment Corp., 168 Misc. 617, 6
N.Y.S.2d 71, 72 (1938).
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v. Bank of Birmingham,24 in which the federal usury statutes were
held applicable to national banks participating in installment pro-
grams. The majority noted that usurious contracts were condemned
by state and national policy and such policy should not be defeated
by the ingenious drafting of a sales contract.
West Virginia law, as regards usury, is not noticeably different
from the laws of the rest of the country. As elsewhere, all contracts
and assurances made directly or indirectly for the loan or forbearance
of money at a greater rate of interest than six per cent are void as
to any interest in excess of that rate,25 and the cases have defined
usury as interest exceeding the lawful rate for the loan or forbearance
of money.26
In West Virginia there is no usury in a bona fide sale but only
where there is a loan or forbearance of money. The courts will only
apply the usury statute to a sale when it is shown that it is a mere
cover for a loan or forbearance.2 7 In essence, the courts are saying
it is substance not form that is controlling but as in the other jurisdic-
tions the test, to determine when such substance is usurious, is not
shown.
The usury statutes today do not meet the requirements of society
as they did a hundred years ago. In our economy today the real
party to be protected is the consumer who finds it necessary to pur-
chase merchandise on credit. He is the counterpart of the needy
referred to in earlier decisions. Credit sales are no longer limited
to parties who may select their vendor. The courts could, if they
saw fit, adapt the existing laws to the factual situations and thereby
alleviate the hardships flowing from the abuses of the finance charge.
Since the trend very obviously is not in that direction, it seems the
only solution is for the legislatures to enact remedial legislation.
There would probably be fewer abuses of a usurious nature if the
public were made aware of the cost of credit. A simple law requiring
that there be a listing of all charges in a credit sale could go far in
counteracting this evil. Utah and California have progressive laws
embodying such a provision. Also, if the maximum interest rates
do not provide for the cost of consumer credit then the legislature
24 227 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1956).2
-W. VA. CODE ch. 47, art. 6, § 6 (Michie 1955).26 Reger v. O'Neal 33 W. Va. 159, 10 S.E. 375 (1889).27Swayne v. Riddle 37 W. Va. 291, 16 S.E. 512 (1892).
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and not the courts should remedy it. The purpose of the usury
statutes has been lost through court modification and deletion. If
they are no longer valid then they should be repealed but if they
are still meant to protect the consumer, let us allow sufficient safe-
guard.
Michael Joseph Foley
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